GODFAITH.TXT : EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Re: THE SPIRIT OF TRUTH AND THE GOOD FAITH OF CATHOLIC
FUNDAMENTALISM
By: John Paul Jones
At: 1998
To: whomsoever
"....the Spirit is truth." John I, The Holy Bible
I. Basic Tenets of Good Faith
"Truth? What is that?" So asked Pontius Pilate, as
though his despair of knowing the truth wasn't the perfect
excuse to avoid looking for the truth that stared him in
the eyes. That is, Pilate's question was rhetorical, or so
I'd wager, for to to the question, "What is truth?"
Pilate's unspoken reply, in effect, might be construed to
mean: "Jesus only knows, but he ain't telling." That is,
Pilate was expressing the age-old skepticism and
relativism prevalent today, which holds that it's naive to
think we can know "the truth," much less any objective
"truth."
Or should we suppose that Pilate's question was sincere,
that he was asking Jesus to engage in a rational discourse
about the nature of truth? Not likely, I think, and in any
case, Jesus evidently didn't think so, because, in the
face of Pilate's question, Jesus remained silent, knowing,
perhaps, what I can only surmise: namely, that Pilate was
not expressing a desire to know the truth but the cynical
and skeptical belief that objective truth cannot be known.
Against the skepticism, relativism, and subjectivism which
weaken faith in our capacity to know objective truth, the
following reasonings are proposed.
There's a general consensus in epistemology, the branch of
philosophy which concerns itself with the nature, source,
and criteria of knowledge, that to know something, three
conditions must be met:
1) it must be believed. 2) it must be true. 3) the person
who believes it must have good or conclusive reasons to
believe it.
Most of the controversy seems to surround the third
condition, because there's disagreement as to what can be
rightly construed as conclusive evidence or whether "true
belief with good reason" is sufficient. In any case,
according to the rules of rational inference (logic), we
have good reason to believe a proposition if a sound
argument can be constructed to establish it, where an
argument is sound if and only if each premise is true and
the logic valid. The logic is said to be valid just in
case the conclusion must be true if each premise is true.
Assumed:
Q: We know some things.
R: To know something, it must be believed. S: To know
something, it must be true. T: To know something, we need
conclusive reasons to believe it.
Given these assumptions, it can be soundly reasoned, I
think, that faith in God, or, if you prefer, faith in the
truth, remains, as always, not only a form of knowledge
but a needful condition of knowledge, not only rational
but a necessary condition of rationality, and not only a
good faith but a needful condition of good faith, and as
such, it's shared, more or less, to a greater or lesser
degree, in one way or another, by all people in all ages
in all cultures.
By 'faith in the truth,' I mean to say the belief that
1) the truth exists. 2) the truth can be known or
believed. If faith in truth is a form of knowledge, then,
for each proposition entailed in faith in the truth, each
condition of knowledge must be met.
I. Faith in the truth as a form of knowledge:
A) that 1) truth exists and 2) truth can be known
1) Truth exists:
If we know some things, truth exists. We know some things.
Therefore, truth exists.
In other words, by the second condition of knowledge (S),
if we know something, it must be true, and if it must be
true, then presumably, truth exists if we know anything.
This does not delve into what, exactly, truth is, for the
point is simply that, whatever truth is, it is if we know
anything.
Extreme skeptics, though, would deny the second premise.
But to do so is to implicitly admit that one doesn't know
what one is talking about, for presumably, if we can't
know anything, the skeptic can't know what he's talking
about.
2) Truth can be known or believed:
If we know anything, truth can be believed. We know some
things. Therefore, truth can be believed.
That is, by the first condition of knowledge (R), if we
know something, it must be believed, and by the second
condition (S), it must be true, so if we know anything, it
follows that truth not only exists to be believed but can
be believed, because it is believed insofar as we know
anything.
B) that 1) we believe that (truth exists) and 2) we
believe that (truth can be known or believed.
1) we believe that (truth exists).
Presumably, if we believe that various things are true, we
believe, also, that truth exists, in some sense, to be
known or believed.
2) we believe that (truth can be known or believed)
Presumably, if we believe that we believe anything that's
true, we believe that something true can be believed.
C) that we have good reason to believe that 1) truth
exists and 2) truth can be known or believed.
If the absurdly simple arguments above are sound, we have
good reason to think that 1) truth exists, and 2) truth
can be known or believed.
The arguments above are sound.
So we have good reason to believe that truth exists and
that truth can be known or believed, i.e., faith in the
truth is a form of knowledge.
II. That faith in the truth is a necessary condition of
belief.
A) to believe something, we must believe that (the truth
exists):
To believe something is to believe it on the condition
that one thinks it is true, for I cannot now believe
something I now think is false.
I cannot now believe something is true if I now believe
truth does not exist, i.e., if I believe nothing is true.
Therefore, to believe something, I must believe that truth
exists.
B) To believe something, we must believe that (truth can
be believed or known).
To believe something is to believe it on the condition
that one thinks it is true, for I cannot now believe
something I now think is false.
We cannot now believe something is true if we now believe
that truth cannot be believed or known, i.e., that nothing
believed is true.
Therefore, to believe something, I must believe that truth
can be known or believed.
C) If the last two arguments are sound, then belief
requires faith in the truth.
III. That faith in the truth is a necessary condition of
knowledge.
A) Belief requires faith in the truth. Knowledge requires
belief. Therefore, knowledge requires faith in the truth.
If knowledge requires faith in the truth, then if we don't
have good reasons for our faith in the truth, we don't
have good reasons to believe anything, because the
propositions of which faith in the truth consist are
premises of every argument, albeit usually unspoken and
unconscious assumptions. For every argument tries to
establish that each premise is true, which is a futile or
erroneous premise if truth does not exist or cannot be
believed.
IV. That faith in the truth is universal:
A. Belief requires faith in the truth. We all believe some
things. Therefore, we all have faith in the truth.
B. Knowledge requires faith in the truth. We all know some
things. Therefore, we all have faith in the truth.
In other words, assuming that all people have beliefs, we
can infer that all people in all ages in all cultures
believe(d) in truth, whether consciously or not.
V. That faith in the truth is a necessary condition of
rationality.
A. Though there is disagreement among epistemologists as
to what rationality consists of, it is agreed that,
whatever knowledge, skills, or dispositions are required,
rationality must be "truth conducive," which is to say, it
must be such that it is conducive to believing truth
rather than falsehood. Obviously, if faith in truth is a
necessary condition of knowledge, then it's likely a
necessary condition of rationality, also, but that will
not be assumed but argued as follows.
It's been observed by Alston, a contemporary American
epistemologist, in his book "Epistemic Justification,"
that one can seek knowledge or pursue truth earnestly but
fecklessly, sincerely but superstitiously, honestly but
irrationally. For example, an tribal African aborigines
engaged in say, astrology or bone reading, may be earnest
in his pursuit of knowledge, and what's more, due to no
fault of his own, may lack whatever skills, knowledge, or
habits of thought are required for rationality, as
Westerners perceive rationality, but because this lack of
knowledge is due to no fault of his own, but as a
consequence of circumstances beyond his volitional
control, his irrationality is not blameworthy. Or, in
Alston's words, the aborigine would be 'deontologically
justified' but not 'epistemically justified,' provided
that he seeks truth as best he knows how.
That is, though his methods are unscientific and may
violate the rules of rational inference, as described
above, and though, therefore, his mode of seeking
knowledge may not be altogether conducive to arriving at
true conclusions, he nevertheless has not violated his
perceived duties in forming beliefs or acquiring
knowledge, but rather, in his eyes, he is fulfilling those
duties. So, in Alston's words, he's "deontologically
justified." In other words, his methods may not be truth
conducive, yet his intent may be.
That is to say, as I would describe the situation, the
aborigine may be honest but irrational, for honesty is not
measured by how much we know, or by our methods of
acquiring knowledge, but rather by how hard we try to
know, and presumably, the motive, attitude, disposition,
or desire to know truth is itself truth conducive, albeit
no guarantee of establishing or discovering truth. After
all, we can imagine a person, say, a Harvard Phd, who has
whatever knowledge, skills, or intellectual habits are
required for rationality, but who, for whatever reasons,
chooses to not apply them, in which case, though he has
the ability or potential to think rationally, he does not
do so.
So, I distinguish between rationality and honesty,-- just
as Alston does--though he uses different terms, and
clearly, intellectual honesty, which is the desire,
motive, attitude, or inclination to discover or know truth
is a necessary condition of rationality, for rationality,
it's agreed, must be truth conducive, and presumably, in
order to apply whatever skills or knowledge are entailed
in rationality, we must have some motive, desire, or
inclination to do so, and since honesty, or as I prefer to
call it, the spirit of truth, provides, or consists of,
just such a motive, I infer that honesty is a necessary,
though not sufficient, cause of rationality.
In other words, rationality requires honesty, as the case
of the Harvard professor demonstrates, but intellectual
honesty does not necessarily require rationality, as the
case of the African aborigines illustrates. That said, we
can reason as follows:
Honesty requires faith in the truth. Rationality requires
honesty. Therefore, rationality requires faith in the
truth.
The first premise of this last syllogism is true, I think,
because if, per impossibility, we didn't believe that the
truth exists, we would have no motive to seek it, and if
and insofar as we don't believe that the truth can be
known or believed, we will likewise lack the desire or
inclination to know or believe the truth. For in either
case, the acquisition of knowledge will seem vain or
futile. That's one reason, among many, I think, why it
says in the Bible that those without faith cannot please
God. To lack faith in God is to lack honesty, the spirit
of truth. For according to the Bible, God is the truth,
and if so, then to lack faith in God is to lack faith in
truth. In other words, as St. Anslem said, we must believe
first (have faith) so that we can understand. Without
faith in truth, we lack the desire to understand or see
clearly, which is to suggest, we reason in bad faith.
However, precisely because all people do have some faith
in the truth, all people, the African aborigine no less
than the Harvard Phd, are capable of honesty or dishonesty
insofar as they are faithful or unfaithful to their most
profound and enduring faith; namely, faith in the truth,
which, as I see it, is faith in God.
On on the other hand, because it is possible, and in fact,
common, for people to hold other beliefs or doctrines
which are logically inconsistent with their faith in the
truth, e.g., extreme skepticism, which holds that
knowledge is impossible, or cultural relativism, which
holds that there are no universal or objective moral
imperatives, it is possible for a person to be more or
less lacking in honesty or in faith in the truth, albeit
never altogether lacking, because, as Polayni said, "Any
attempt to deny the existence of truth is
self-contradictory, because it's an attempt to establish
an important truth." Presumably, if mystics can know that
reality, or our perception of reality, is illusory, they
must have some truth, or some standard of objective truth,
by which to measure or detect the decetion and demonstrate
that their conceptual relativism is sound.
So, there you have my absurdly simple arguments for
holding that faith in the truth, or as I prefer to say,
faith in God, is not only a form of knowledge but a
necessary condition of knowledge, not only rational but a
necessary condition of rationality, not only a good faith
but a necessary condition of good faith, and what's more,
as a necessary condition of belief, and therefore, of
knowledge, this faith is universal or catholic, shared to
a greater or lesser degree by all people in all ages in
all cultures.
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Sources:
Alston, William P. (1989) Epistemic Justification: Essays
in the Theory of Knowledge, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca and London
Basil, Mitchell (1981) The Justification of Religious
Belief Oxford University Press
Kneale, Martha and William (1962) The Development of Logic
Clarendon Press, Oxford
Kalish, Donald; Montague, Richard; Mar, Gary (1980) Logic:
Techniques of Formal Reasoning, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Polyani, Michael (1946) Science, Faith, and Society, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London
Cornford, Francis M. (1957) Plato's Theory of Knowledge:
The Theatetus and the Sophist of Plato, Macmillon
Publishing Company, New York
Runzo, Joseph; Ihara, Craig (1986) Religious Experience
and Religious Belief: Essays in the Epistemology of
Religion, University Press of America, Inc.
END NOTES:
Though certainly fundamental and foundational, this faith
in the truth is not fundamentally Protestant and should be
distinquished from "Christian fundamentalism", or what is
sometimes called "Protestant fundamentalism", which is the
doctrine allegedly described by Bouyer in his book, "The
Spirit and Forms of Protestantism", where he writes: "a
Protestant doctrine that restricted all communication from
God to man to the letter of the Scriptures, so hardening
the religion of the Word into a religion of the book." The
Protestants, however, would likely object to this, because
they clearly believe that God can communicate directly or
indirectly via other means, e.g., through dreams, but what
they do believe, if I understand them correctly, as it was
described to us by Marylyn Hickey, is that communication
from God via any other means, e.g., via dreams, visions,
or alleged modern-day prophets, must be tested, confirmed,
and evaluated in light of Scriptures. In any case, what we
have described herein is not be confused with the dogma of
Sola Scriptura, or what is sometimes erroneously called
"Christian fundamentalism". How can the dogma of Sola
Scriptura be fundamental to the Christian faith if most of
the Christian world, i.e., Catholic Christianity, rejects
this doctrine as false and unscriptural?
In contrast, insofar as the faith in truth as here defined
is universal as a necessary condition of any particular or
diverse faith, it's truly fundamental. Christianity is not
unique because it adheres to this faith, of course, but it
is unique because it alone can justify this faith and give
it religious fervor. As Neitzsche observed, the scientific
faith is a metaphysical one that's based on the faith of
Christianity, which was also the philosophical faith of
Plato; namely, that God is truth, that truth is Divine. In
rejecting occult dualism, which holds that both good and
evil, truth and lie, are necessary, and therefore good, it
alone among diverse faiths sanctifies and deifies truth as
the transcedent and holy God of Israel and Savior of the
world: "I am the way, the truth, and the life", claimed
Jesus Christ.
This may raise questions in the minds of Christian readers
insofar as they might wonder if it isn't idolotry to deify
an attribute of God. For truth, they would argue, is only
one among many attributes of God, and it would be wrong to
try to make this quality into the Supreme Being. We might
put the question this way: Is truth God? No, they might
argue. Yet, as this is far beyond the scope of this essay,
I simply raise the question and leave it to the reader to
ponder: God is truth, but is truth God?
